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Moeller: Moeller: Bailments--Allocation of the Burden of Proving the Bailee's Negligence

RECENT CASES

BAILMIENTS-ALLOCATION OF THE
BURDEN OF PROVING THE
BAILEE'S NEGLIGENCE
Broadview Leasing Co. v. Cape Central Airways, Inc.1

Plaintiffs owned two airplanes and aircraft equipment which defendant Cape Central stored and serviced at the Cape Girardeau airport in
hangars leased from the City of Cape Girardeau. 2 Cape Central was
also responsible for the management and operation of the airport under
various agreements with the city. The Cape Girardeau area was struck
by a violent thunderstorm during which a bolt of lightning ignited the
roof of the wooden hangar housing plaintiffs' airplanes and equipment.
After trying to control the fire with a garden hose, Cape Central's night
watchman called the fire department. By the time the fire department
reached the scene, the fire had consumed the hangar and both aircraft
had exploded.
Plaintiffs brought an action against Cape Central in three counts,
alleging breach of a bailment contract, specific negligence, and general
negligence under res ipsa loquitur. Evidence was introduced at trial to
show that two fires had previously occurred at the airport, that one of
these fires was caused by lightning, and that a wooden hangar was destroyed in that fire. Testimony showed that the hangar housing plaintiffs' aircraft had not been equipped with sprinklers, usable hydrants,
fire prevention materials, or lightning rods.
Cape Central denied the allegations of negligence and alleged that
the loss was caused by an act of God. It introduced evidence of the
acquisition of portable fire extinguishers and an old fire truck, and, over
plaintiffs' objection, evidence of the fire protection practices of similar
airports in the area. Plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on the
ground that defendant Cape Central failed to sustain its burden of proving that the loss was not due to its negligence. The trial court denied
the motion, indicating that the burden of proving the bailee's negligence
was on the bailor. The St. Louis District of the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's placement of the burden of proving the bailee's negligence, and in so doing clarified the law of bailments in Missouri. It

1. 539 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
2. Broadview Leasing Co. and National Enterprises, Inc. each owned an
airplane; Astro Rentals, Inc. owned the aircraft equipment. Id. at 555.
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seems anomalous that the elements of an ancient legal relationship 3
should need clarification in the twentieth century; yet, allocation of the
burden of proof in bailment actions has been a continuing source of
confusion to courts in Missouri 4 and nationwide. 5 The purpose of this
note is to study Missouri law relating to this problem.
Much of the confusion has been produced by the evolution of three
6
different methods to apportion the burden of proof in bailment actions.
Most states place upon the bailor the burden of establishing the bailment, the failure to redeliver, and the bailee's failure to exercise the
requisite degree of care. 7 A second group of states also require the
bailor to establish the bailment and the failure to redeliver, but relieve
the bailor of the burden of proving the bailee's negligence. 8 In those
jurisdictions, the bailee has the burden of proving his exercise of due
care as an affirmative defense. 9 A third group of states synthesizes the
first two rules by allocating the burden of proof on the issue of negligence based on the cause of action selected by the bailor. When the
bailor sues in tort, he is required to establish the bailee's negligence.' 0 If

3. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 336-50 (3d ed. 1927).
4. Broadview Leasing Co. v. Cape Central Airways, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 553,
560 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976) ("The whole question of which party bears the
'burden of proof' in a bailment situation has not been clearly articulated in this
state."); Nuell v. Forty-North Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70, 76 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962)
("Some confusion appears to have arisen regarding which party carries the burden of proof when the bailor's action is bottomed on a breach of the contract of
bailment, rather than on negligence."); Freeman v. Foreman, 141 Mo. App. 359,
363, 125 S.W. 524, 526 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910) ("There has been some confusion in
early decisions in this state upon [the] question [who carries the burden of proof
in a bailment situation] .... ").
5. See 8 AM. JUR. 2dBailments § 306 (1963); Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 171 (1972).
6. R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.8 (3d ed. 1975). See also, Comment,
Burden of Proof of Bailee's Negligence in Connection with His Failure to Redeliver, 8
HAsTINGS L. REv. 89 (1956).
7. See, e.g., Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58
N.E.2d 658 (1944); Wyatt v. Baughman, 121 Utah 98, 239 P.2d 193 (1951).
8. See, e.g., Low v. Park Price Co., 95 Idaho -91, 503 P.2d 291 (1972);
Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 362 Mass. 642, 289 N.E.2d 879 (1972) (excellent discussion of history of the law); National Surety Corp. v. Todd County Dairy Coop.,
269 Minn. 298, 130 N.W.2d 511 (1964); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 186
Ore. 285, 206 P.2d 963 (1949); Kelly v. Capital Motors, 204 S.C. 304, 28 S.E.2d
836 (1944).
9. The bailee in such a case bears the entire burden of proof on the issue.
Care must be exercised in reading the decisions, for the burden borne by the
bailee is often framed in ambiguous terms. The phrase "burden of proof" is
often used, where from the context of the opinion it is apparent that the burden
of production of evidence is all that is intended.
10. See, e.g., Broadview Leasing Co. v. Cape Central Airways, Inc., 539
S.W.2d 553 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); Bohmont v. Moore, 138 Neb. 784, 295
N.W. 419 (1940); Boyles v. Campbell, 420 P.2d 875 (Okla. 1966); Canty v. Wyatt
Storage Corp., 208 Va. 161, 156 S.E.2d 582 (1967). See generally, R. BROWN, supra

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/11

2

Moeller: Moeller: Bailments--Allocation of the Burden of Proving the Bailee's Negligence
[Vol. 43
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the bailor's action is in contract, however, the bailee has the burden of
proving his exercise of due care as an affirmative defense.1 1 Broadview
2
Leasing places Missouri in this third group of states.1
The Missouri rule enunciated in Broadview Leasing requires the
bailor suing in tort to prove the bailee's negligence. Courts have recognized that this rule creates a difficult task for a bailor attempting to
prove specific negligent acts of the bailee . 3 To assist the bailor, courts
have held that a "presumption" ' 4 of negligence arises once the bailor
has offered evidence to prove the bailment and the failure of the bailee
to redeliver upon a legal demand. 5 The effect of this presumption is
to shift to the bailee the burden of production of evidence on the issue
of due care and to make a submissible case for the bailor."
Missouri
courts have recognized this doctrine of presumptions,17 albeit not without a certain measure of ambiguity.' 8 Such ambiguity is a frequent by-

note 6, § 11.8; Annot., supra note 5; Brodkey, PracticalAspects of Bailment Proof, 45
MARQ. L. REv. 531 (1962).
11. See authorities cited note 10 supra.
12." 539 S.W.2d 553, 560-61. Missouri cases further distinguish between allegations of general negligence and specific negligence when the bailor's action is
in tort. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text infra.
13. Low v. Park Price Co., 95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291 (1972); Knowles v.
Gilchrist Co., 362 Mass. 642, 289 N.E.2d 879 (1972); McKeever v. Kramer, 203
Mo. App. 269, 218 S.W. 403 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920); Freeman v. Foreman, 141
Mo. App. 359, 365, 125 S.W. 524, 526 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910) ("To require the
plaintiff ... to prove specific acts of negligence which caused the injury, or to
prove in what particular the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care ... would
be to place upon him an impossible burden, and require him to assume the
responsibility of proving facts that were exclusively within the knowledge of the
defendants ... and would be equivalent to denying him any relief at all.").
14. See note 18, infra, for a discussion of the terms "inference" and "presumption."
15. See, e.g., Watson v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 7 Ill. App. 3d 662, 288 N.E.2d
233 (1972); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Star-Craft Corp., 499 P.2d 776 (Mont.
1972); Sumison v. Streator-Smith Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943). See
generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972).
16. Nuell v. Forty-North Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962);
Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Rosenberg, 179 S.W.2d 476 (St. L. Mo. App. 1944).
17. Bommer v. Stedelin, 237 S.W.2d 225, 227 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951); Oliver
Cadillac Co. v. Rosenberg, 179 S.W.2d 476, 480 (St. L. Mo. App. 1944); Freeman
v. Foreman, 141 Mo. App. 359, 364-65, 125 S.W. 524, 526 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910);
Casey v. Donovan, 65 Mo. App. 521, 527 (St. L. Ct. App. 1896). See note 50 infra
suggesting that this presumption is no longer needed in Missouri.
18. The effect of the Missouri decisions is to raise only an inference of negligence where general allegations of negligence suggest a recovery under res ipsa
loquitur. Because of the imprecision with which the terms "presumption" and
"inference" have been used, however, one finds Missouri cases which hold that a
prima facie res ipsa case raises a presumption of negligence. Weinberg v. Wayco
Petroleum Co., 402 S.W.2d 597, 598 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966); Nuell v. FortyNorth Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70, 76 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Bommer v. Stedelin,
237 S.W.2d 225, 227 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951). The terms "presumption" and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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product of the operation of the bailor's presumption, which in practice
confounds rather than simplifies his task.
The operation of presumptions is complicated by rules which require varying amounts of evidence to rebut the presumption. Although
there are several alternative rules which may regulate this issue, 19 most
jurisdictions follow the Thayer rule. 20 To rebut a presumption, the
Thayer rule requires the party against whom the presumption operates
to produce enough evidence in his favor to support a jury verdict on
that issue. Missouri follows the Thayer approach, 2 1 although there is
conflict in Missouri 22 and in other states 23 as to what type of evidence
will satisfy the test. A minority rule requires only that the bailee show
the cause of the loss or damage, e.g., loss by fire, in order to rebut the

"inference" are terms which have fundamentally different meanings, and yet are
often confused by the courts in bailment cases. According to Wigmore,
[a] presumption ... is in its characteristic feature a rule of law
laid down by the judge, and attaching to one evidentiary fact
certain procedural consequences as to the duty of production of
other evidence by the opponent. It is based, in poiicy, upon the
probative strength, as a matter of reasoning and inference, of
the evidentiary fact; but the presumption is not the fact itself,
nor the inference itself, but the legal consequence attached to
9 J.

it.
WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE

§ 2491 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original). A presump-

tion, then, is a procedural device which is used only by the court to allocate the
burden of production of evidence. On the other hand, an inference is a permissible deduction drawn from the evidence and as such is only of primary concern
to the trier of fact. Id. Because of the substantial differences in the operation of
these principles, the need for their proper application in bailment cases becomes
clearer. For example, in a jurisdiction where the bailor is required to prove the
bailee's negligence, the bailor will automatically prevail on the issue of negligence
if a presumption operated in his favor and the bailee failed to rebut it. But if the
bailor's only advantage was an inference, then the jury under the same circumstances would theoretically be free to find for either party. The importance
of the distinction is underscored where the bailed property has been destroyed

and evidence of the bailee's negligence may be nearly impossible to obtain.
19. See Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721
(1959) for a discussion of the alternatives, each of which varies in the amount of
evidence required to overcome a presumption, and in whether the responsibility for
determining if that has been done is on the court or jury.
20. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 345.
21. Terminal Warehouses of St. Joseph, Inc. v. Reiners, 371 S.W.2d 311 (Mo.
1963); "Presumptions may be looked on as the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight,

but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts." Mackowick v. Kansas City, St. J. &
C.B. Ry., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W. 256, 262 (1906).
22. Compare Levi v. Missouri K. & T. Ry., 157 Mo. App. 536, 138 S.W. 699 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1911) (bailee need only show loss by fire to exonerate) with Walters v. Adams

Transfer & Storage Co., 235 Mo. App. 713, 141 S.W. 2d 205 (K.C. Ct. App. 1940)
(evidence of loss by fire insufficient as matter of law to exonerate).
23. See R. BROWN, supra note 6, § 11.8; Brodkey, supra note 10; Annot., supra
note 5.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/11
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presumption of negligence.14 The majority rule requires that the bailee
go further and produce some evidence as to his exercise of due care in
order to rebut the presumption. 25 The policy objectives underlying the
majority rule are basically the same as those which fathered the presumption of negligence. 26 Such objectives include placing the burden of
proof on the party with access to the facts and placing the risk of financial loss on the party best able to bear that loss. Courts following the
majority rule generally recognize the ease with which those objectives
can be frustrated by application of the minority rule. 27 Although it has
not always been the case, 28 Missouri now appears to follow the majority
rule2 9 and requires the bailee to produce evidence of the exercise of due
care in order to rebut the presumption of his negligence.
Broadview Leasing mandates a different allocation of the burden of
proof if a bailor sues on the contract. The bailor must establish the bailment and failure to redeliver. The bailee.has the burden of proving the
exercise of due care as an affirmative defense.3 0 This rule can be viewed
as placing a much heavier burden on the bailee in bailment actions on
the contract. The bailee must carry not only the burden of production of
evidence as in tort actions, but also must assume the burden of persuasion on the issue of negligence. The Broadview Leasing court rejected the
application of this stricter rule to bailment actions based in tort, thereby

24. Although the bailee is required by this rule to producesome evidence as to his
own due care, this is only used to rebut the bailor's presumption. The bailee does not
assume the burden of persuasion on the due care issue. See authorities cited in note 22
supra.

25. Id.
26. Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 362 Mass. 642, 643-50, 289 N.E.2d 879, 880-84
(1972) (The court outlines the development of the law and the policy objectives
sought to be furthered, discussing in particular the superiority of the bailee's knowledge of the circumstances of loss over the bailor's.).
27. "The imposition of such a minimal burden of production on the bailee
defeats the rule's basic purpose because the bailee can simply note that a theft or a fire
of unknown origin made delivery of the bailed goods impossible and rest his case."
Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 362 Mass. 642, 648, 289 N.E.2d 879, 883 (1972).
28. Levi v. Missouri K. & T. Ry., 157 Mo. App. 536, 138 S.W. 699 (K.C. Ct. App.
1911); E.O. Stanard Milling Co. v. White Line Cent. Transit Co., 122 Mo. 258, 26
S.W. 704 (1894).
29. Scholman v. Joplin Auto Auction Co., 439 S.W.2d 215 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969)
(explanation of loss by theft insufficient); Walters v. Adams Transfer & Storage, 235
Mo. App. 713, 141 S.W.2d 205 (K.C. Ct. App. 1940) (explanation of loss by fire
insufficient).
30. Broadview Leasing Co. v. Cape Central Airways, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 553, 561
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); Crow Contracting Corp. v. George F. Smith Co., 407
S.W.2d 593,597 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966); Nuell v. Forty-North Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70,
76 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Freeman v. Foreman, 141 Mo. App. 359, 125 S.W. 524
(Spr. Ct. App. 1910); E.O. Stanard Milling Co. v. White Line Cent. Transit Co., 122
Mo. 258, 275; 26 S.W. 704, 709 (1894) (dictum); Goodfellow's Executors v.
Meegan, 32 Mo. 280 (1862).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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reaffirming the distinction Missouri courts have drawn between tort and
contract theories 1for the purpose of allocating the burden of proof in
bailment actions.

3

Although the tort-contract distinction is recognized in many Ameri-

32
can jurisdictions, its particular application in Missouri is unusual.

Mis-

souri courts subdivide bailment actions based in tort into two sub-classifications: "specific" and "general" negligence. 33 The general negligence
cases are actually based on a res ipsa loquitur theory; Missouri courts seem
to use the terms interchangeably in bailment cases. If a bailor alleges
specific negligence, he must carry both the burden of production of evidence and the burden of persuasion on the issue of negligence. 34 The
bailor does not obtain the benefit of a presumption to satisfy these burdens of proof.35 On the other hand, a bailor who pleads and proves a
res ipsa case enjoys the benefit of an inference 36 of negligence and
thereby makes a submissible case.3 7 The line between specific negligence and res ipsa is not always easily drawn. Pleadings make out a negligence cause of action based on res ipsa if they do not state a particular
negligent act or omission and do not name the individual responsible for
the loss or injury. Res ipsa pleadings would not withstand a motion to

31. However, it should be carefully noted that the effect of this rule isnot to create
a so-called "shifting burden," since in contract cases both the burden of production
and persuasion remain on the same parties throughout the trial. Such a shifting
burden may only be said to exist when a presumption operates during the course of
trial to shift the burden of production to a party who does not have the burden of
persuasion on that issue. J. WIGMloRE.supra note 18, § 2491.
32. The Missouri cases are among the few cases encountered which clearly
articulate the distinctions between actions in contract, specific negligence, and general negligence (res ipsa loquitur) as discussed in the textual matter infra. Some states
which have confronted the issue use the same approach Missouri does. See Boyles v.
Campbell, 420 P.2d 875,878 (Okla. 1966); Newton Chevrolet Co. v. Canle, 31 Tenn.
App. 67, 212 S.W.2d 392 (1948).
33. While speaking in terms of "general" negligence, the Missouri courts are
evidently referring to a cause of action based on res ipsa loquitur. Broadway Leasing
Co. v. Cape Central Airways, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); Nuell v.
Forty-North Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Freeman v. Foreman, 141
Mo. App. 359, 125 S.W. 524 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910).
34. Nuell v. Forty-North Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Bommer
v. Stedelin, 237 S.W.2d 225, 228 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951); E. 0. Stanard Milling Co. v.
White Line Cent. Transit Co., 122 Mo. 258, 26 S.W. 704 (1894).
35. See cases cited note 33 supra, note 50 infra.
36. Some cases use the term "presumption" as discussed in note 17, supra. This
usage is particularly misleading in res ipsa cases, for if correct it would require a
mandatory finding of negligence on the bailee's part if he failed to meet the burden
of producing evidence of due care. Such is not the law in res ipsa cases, however, since
the trier of fact must always find negligence as an independent finding, in addition to
the basic circumstances that gave rise to the inference. See Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No.
31.02 (1969 ed.).
37. Nuell v. Forty-North Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Bommer
v. Stedelin, 237 S.W.2d 225 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/11
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make more definite if the case were tried on a specific negligence
theory."'
Different evidentiary burdens attach to the respective types of negligence because of a general belief by Missouri courts that negligence is a
positive wrong, and therefore ought never to be presumed.3 9 Such a
rationale in bailment actions is contradicted by the existence of the presumptions discussed earlier. Further, the utility of the specific negligence-res ipsa distinction in bailment cases grounded in tort is limited
by the bailor's option in Missouri to sue on the contract, forcing the
bailee to carry the burden of proving his own due care by way of an
affirmative defense.
The ability of a bailor to state a bailment claim in contract is recognized in Missouri, 40 although there only after years of confusion. One of
the earliest cases to recognize the contractual remedy was Goodfellow's
Executors v. Meegan.41 The bailee sued for the price on a contract to
keep the bailor's oxen. The defendant-bailor sought by way of counterclaim to recover the value of three oxen not returned by the bailee.
Each party argued the other had the burden of proof on the issue of the
bailee's negligence. The court stated that once the bailment and failure
to return were alleged and proved, it was incumbent upon the bailee to
prove the loss of the bailed goods was not due to his negligence. Wiser v.
Chesley4 2 followed this rule by holding that after a bailor established his
prima facie case of delivery and non-return, "[t]he onus is then upon the
[bailee] to exonerate himself from the liability ....,,43 However, subsequent decisions interpreted Wiser as a negligence action 44 and construed "exonerate" to require only an explanation of the loss which would
comply with the minimal requirements of the "minority rule," i.e., it was
not necessary for the bailee to show his own due care.45
38. See, e.g., Bommerv. Stedelin, 237 S.W.2d 225 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951); Benner

v. Terminal R.R., 156 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. 1941).

39. Witting v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 101 Mo. 631, 640, 14 S.W. 743, 745 (1890)
("[Niegligence is a positive wrong and will not be presumed, though it may be

inferred from circumstances ....The party who founds his cause of action upon
negligence must be prepared to establish the assertion by proof.").
40. Broadview Leasing Co. v. Cape Central Airways, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1976); Nuell v. Forty-North Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70 (St. L. Mo. App.
1962).
41. 32 Mo. 280 (1862).
42. 53 Mo. 547 (1873).
43. Id. at 550.
44. See the discussion of early bailment principles in Freeman v. Foreman, 141
Mo. App. 359, 363-65, 125 S.W. 524, 526 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910).
45. See text accompanying note 23 supra;E.O. Stanard Milling Co. v. White Line
Cent. Transit Co., 122 Mo. 258, 276, 26 S.W. 704, 709 (1894); Witting v. St. Louis &
S.F. Ry., 101 Mo. 631, 639, 14 S.W. 743, 745 (1890); McKeever v. Kramer, 203 Mo.
App. 269,275,218 S.W. 403,405 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920); Crawford v. Cashman &Son,
82 Mo. App. 554, 558 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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After Wiser Missouri law governing bailment actions based in contract became confused. Contractual recoveries were not possible for
some period of time because of the rules applied by the courts. For
example, in Cummings v. Mastin 46 the court held that the bailor had the
burden of proving the negligence of the bailee after the bailor had alleged breach of the bailment contract. 47 Similar results were reached in
other cases where courts interpreted pleadings which stated a cause of
action in contract as implicitly alleging negligence. 48 During this period,
Missouri courts entertained a belief that bailors should use the negligence form of action. 49 Broadview Leasing and other recent cases have
corrected this situation by firmly establishing the existence in Missouri
law of separate bailment actions in tort and on the contract."
By reaffirming the contract-tort distinction, Broadview Leasing
clarified the law in Missouri at the expense of perpetuating a rule based
on the subtleties of pleading and which has been the subject of substan46. 43 Mo. App. 558, 560 (K.C. Ct. App. 1890).
47. See also McKeever v. Kramer, 203 Mo. App. 269,218 S.W. 403 (St. L. Ct. App.
1920). There the court stated, "that plaintiff's petition is sufficient in form to base a
recovery on the theory of gratuitous bailment in the absence of any allegation of
negligence on the part of defendant, but this can only be done by virtue of the facts
that the defendant filed a general denial, and did not confess the bailment.., and
account for the loss of the property .... Id. at 275, 218 S.W. at 405. This ruling is
consistent with Cummings v. Mastin in that it seems to require an allegation of
negligence if the source of the loss can be determined. It thus denies the possibility of
an action alleging only breach of contract, where the bailee is required to prove his
own due care.
48. See, e.g., Crawford v. Cashman &Son, 82 Mo. App. 554 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900).
The court held "where the plaintiff has shown that the bailee received the property in
good condition, and failed to return it, ... he has made out a prima facie case of
negligence ...

."

Id. at 558.

49. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Rosenberg, 179 S.W.2d 476,480 (St. L. Ct. App. 1944)
("[TIhe gist of a cause of action of bailor against bailee is negligence, and the burden
rests on the bailor to plead and prove negligence as the cause of the loss or injury, and
this burden rests on the plaintiff to the end of the case."). See also Bock v. Eilen, 211
S.W.2d 92 (Spr. Mo. App. 1948); McKeever v. Kramer, 203 Mo. App. 269, 218 S.W.
403 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920).
50. The case authority discussed in the preceding two paragraphs is one of two
lines of authority in Missouri law, one recognizing the contract action and one the tort
action. As suggested above, courts tended for a while to recognize only authority
which permitted bailment actions based in tort. Now, however, the contract action is
again recognized. The practical result of this is that the bailor's presumption of
negligence discussed earlier is now stiperfluous. Any action alleging only delivery,
bailment, and non-return will now be interpreted as a contract action, and the bailee
will bear the burden of proof on the due care issue. Years ago, this would have been
the sort of action that the courts would have held to have given rise to the presumption of negligence. The presumption may not arise under other circumstances,
either, since actions alleging general negligence give rise only to an inference and
actions pleading specific negligence require the bailor to prove each act alleged. So
while the doctrine of presumptions has not technically been overruled, a shift in
judicial perceptions has made it obsolete.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/11
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tial criticism. 51 Missouri courts should reconsider the Broadview Leasing
rule and instead place the burden of proving due care on the bailee
regardless of the form of action selected by the bailor. In support of the
Broadview Leasing rule is the acknowledged consistency in burden of
proof allocation which it produces between general tort law and bailment
actions based in tort by always placing the burden of proving negligence
on the plaintiff. While this uniformity may be desirable as a general
proposition, it exalts form over substance because, under Missouri law,
the bailor always may place the burden of proof of negligence on the
bailee by suing on the contract rather than in tort.
If consistency in the law is the goal, courts should apply the same
burden of proof rules to all bailment cases regardless of the form of
action selected. The fact that the bailee probably has superior knowledge
concerning the facts surrounding the loss suggests that the burdens of
proof could best be assumed by the bailee. Such a rule could be justified
under an enterprise liability theory, because bailees are better able than
bailors to purchase insurance for bailment losses and to reflect the premiums in increased service charges. This approach would harmonize
bailment law by applying the same rules to common law bailments as are
applied to bailments under the Uniform Commercial Code, which has
adopted the scheme for warehouse bailments. 52 The use of a single rule
also would reduce the impact of other variations between the remedies,
such as differences between tort and contract statutes of limitations,5 3
51. See, e.g., Knowles v. Gilc-hrist Co., 362 Mass. 642,644-45,289 N.E.2d 879,881
(1972) ("[Courts] created a rule predicated on the art of pleading and.., allocation of
the burden of proof depended on the relative skills of the attorneys for the parties in
drafting the pleadings."); R. BRowN, supra note 6, § 11.8 at 292 ("It is unfortunate to
let the ultimate rights of the parties depend on mere questions of pleading and
practice"). See Low v. Park Price Motors, 95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291 (1972).
52. Section 400.7-403(1), RSMo 1969 provides in part that "[t]he bailee must
deliver the goods.. unless and to the extent thatthe bailee establishes.... damage to or
delay, loss, or destruction of the goods for which the bailee is not liable .... "
(emphasis added). Missouri did not enact an optional phrase at the end of § 400.7403(1) (b) which would have had the effect of placing the burden of proofon the
bailor. See comments to the statute, V.A.M.S. § 400.7-403 (Vernon 1969). Despite the
early tendency of Missouri courts to construe all bailment actions as tort actions, an
exception to this tendency was recognized under the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act, which placed the burden of proving due care on the bailee. See Brown v. Sloan's
Moving & Storage Co., 296 S.W.2d 20, 22, 23 (Mo. 1956) ("[R]egardless of the
technical form of the action (whether in the nature of assumpsit, trover, or case) and
regardless of however the issue of a warehouseman's negligence is raised, [provisions
of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act] impose upon the warehouseman-defendant the burden of ultimately establishing that a loss, although by fire, was not due to
defendant's negligence .... [A]lthough the plaintiff's claim arises out of a contractual relationship and plaintiff may declare as if upon the contract, the gist of
plaintiff's action is negligence, and the burden of proof on the issue-negligence-is on the shoulder of the warehouseman-defendant to disprove his negligence because the Act puts it there.").
53. Section 516.120, RSMo 1969 allows five years to bring actions upon contracts
and actions for taking or injuring goods or chattels. However, differentjurisdictions
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